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Entertainment Design in Mixed Martial Arts
Does Cage Size Matter?
Paul Gift
Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of a change in cage size on fighter performance 
outcomes in Zuffa-owned mixed martial arts (MMA) promotions. Variation in 
cage size is observed through different events over time in the Ultimate Fighting 
Championship (UFC) and World Extreme Cagefighting (WEC). Results suggest 
that smaller cages lead to more fight finishes (knockouts and submissions) and 
higher rates of distance knockdowns and choke attempts, all exciting outcomes 
for viewers. But they also lead to a higher proportion of time with fighters pressed 
against the cage, a position some viewers may dislike. Since MMA promoters com-
pete with other forms of entertainment, findings have strategic implications for 
promoter cage-size decisions.
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Introduction
Sports leagues often alter game parameters in an effort to stimulate fan engage-
ment. Major League Baseball has taken a number of steps in recent years to speed 
up its games including limiting the number of visits to the pitcher’s mound and 
the breaks between innings, as well as allowing for automatic intentional walks. 
The NBA has changed the positioning of its three-point line and implemented 
rules regarding “Hack-a-Shaq” strategies. The NFL restricted timeout usage when 
icing kickers and the NCAA has altered overtime rules in football and the shot 
clock in men’s basketball.
Unlike most other mainstream sports leagues, the Ultimate Fighting Cham-
pionship (UFC) and smaller U.S. mixed martial arts (MMA) promoters do not 
have an ability to alter many aspects of their events. State and tribal athletic com-
missions regulate the rules set, number of rounds, round length, potential weight 
classes, and glove, mouthpiece, and groin protector requirements. While these 
athletic commissions also set minimum and maximum cage/ring sizes, promo-
tion management retains the ability to make strategic decisions on the use of a 
cage or ring, cage shape, and cage/ring size within the regulated minimum and 
maximum criteria.
The world’s largest MMA promoter, the UFC, maintains two cage sizes for 
use in its events: A 30-foot octagonal-shaped cage (known as “The Octagon”) and 
a smaller 25-foot version. Cage size and fighter performance metrics are meticu-
lously and rigorously tracked to a high level of detail by the statistical agency, 
FightMetric LLC, allowing for the investigation of the impact of cage size on vari-
ous elements of fighter performance, particularly bout outcomes such as knockout 
or submission finishes, which may be more desirable to a profit-maximizing pro-
moter than a judges’ decision.
While growing, prior academic research in MMA has been relatively limited. 
Collier, Johnson, and Ruggiero (2011) pioneered study of the sport based on in-
cage fighter performances using bout-level data to examine the role of various 
striking and grappling measures on judging decisions. Gift (2018a) improved 
upon this analysis using performance statistics and judging decisions at the round 
level and finding evidence of favoritism towards larger betting favorites, fighters 
with insurmountable leads, and the fighter who won the most recent round.
In demand literature, Watanabe (2012), Tainsky, Salaga, and Santos (2013), 
and Watanabe (2015) investigated the determinants of UFC pay-per-view buys 
and found evidence supporting viewer preferences for star fighters, certain weight 
classes, main event outcome uncertainty, and holiday weekends. Reams and 
Shapiro (2017) found that PPV demand increased when higher-ranked fighters 
and former champions appeared on a fight card. UFC attendance decisions were 
examined by Tainsky, Salaga, and Santos (2012) and Watanabe (2015) who found 
support for the significance of event timing and location as well as venue capacity. 
More recently, Gift (2018b) estimated the marginal revenue products (MRPs) of 
UFC PPV main card fighters and found a sizeable percentage of fighters generated 
little to no MRP while a small number of stars drove the majority.
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Yet none of these studies directly addresses consumer engagement through 
actual in-cage fighter performances. In work examining MMA spectator motives, 
Seungmo, Greenwell, Andrew, Lee, and Mahony (2008) and Andrew, Kim, O’Neal, 
Greenwell, and James (2009) found aesthetics and drama, and to a lesser extent 
violence, were important motives for spectator attendance of MMA events. The 
UFC also has a revealed preference for knockout/technical knockout (KO/TKO) 
and submission finishes in the sample period through its use of two $50,000 fight 
night bonuses at the end of each event for the best KO/TKO and submission of the 
night (KOTN and SOTN, respectively). Knockout blows, locked-in chokeholds, 
and joint hyperextensions are often climactic events highlighting the beauty, strat-
egy, violence, and drama of the sport, and tend to be more exciting than the sound 
of the final bell and reading the judges’ scoring decisions. One of the newest MMA 
promotions, the Professional Fighters League, attempts to incentivize KO/TKO 
and submission finishes through bonus points in the regular season that help de-
termine the seeding of its eventual playoff structure.
In popular media, Gift (2014) reported on the determinants of UFC Fight of 
the Night (FOTN) awards. FOTN is a monetary bonus awarded at the end of each 
event to “each of the fighters in the best fight of the night” (UFC, 2014). The report 
indicated being in a close fight with a high volume of power strikes to the head 
and legs, visible fighter damage, knockdowns, choke attempts, and a KO/TKO or 
submission finish all increase the likelihood of a fight being awarded FOTN by 
UFC management. The strongest performance factor reducing a fight’s chance of 
winning FOTN was idle time spent in the clinch.
While demand-based studies have provided evidence of the factors affecting 
UFC attendance and PPV buys, the promotion’s fight night bonus decisions reveal 
the fighter performance outcomes management believes generate the “best” fights, 
including a preference for KO/TKO and submission finishes. It stands to reason 
these factors should also better enhance consumer engagement. The present study 
examines the impact of cage size on many of these factors.
MMA Industry Background
The first documented use of the term “mixed martial arts” came from television 
critic Howard Rosenberg in 1993 (U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, 2017), three days after UFC 1 pit various martial arts styles 
against each other in a no-holds-barred competition. MMA has since evolved 
to become a legalized and regulated combat sport of striking and grappling in 
standing positions, against the cage/ropes, or on the ground. While often referred 
to as “cage fighting,” MMA bouts may be held in either a ring or cage (Association 
of Boxing Commissions, 2009), but all bouts in the current study took place in an 
octagon-shaped cage. 
In early 2001, Frank and Lorenzo Fertitta purchased the UFC, then a 
struggling MMA promotion, through their company Zuffa LLC and grew it 
into the largest live pay-per-view event provider in the world (UFC, 2017a). In 
Entertainment Design in Mixed Martial Arts
14
December 2006, Zuffa purchased rival promoter World Extreme Cagefighting 
(WEC) and quickly shifted the new acquisition to lighter weight divisions. The 
super heavyweight and heavyweight divisions were immediately discontinued. 
Light heavyweight and middleweight divisions were shuttered by December 2008, 
and the final welterweight bout took place in March 2009. Zuffa did not use the 
WEC as a feeder to the UFC, but rather an extension of the UFC into the lower 
weight classes. Eighty percent of Zuffa’s bouts with the WEC took place in the 
lightweight division or below.
Zuffa also immediately instituted the Unified Rules of MMA and its UFC cage, 
specifically changing from the WEC’s former pentagon shape to the 25’ version of 
the UFC’s Octagon. Most UFC events utilized a 30’ Octagon, but the company 
maintained the smaller 25’ version for use in tighter venues.
This leads to the two sources of variation in cage size in the present study. 
Over the sample period, 428 of the UFC’s 3,739 bouts (11.5%) took place in the 
smaller cage. In addition, the WEC held 293 bouts under Zuffa ownership with 
the same 25’ Octagon and rules set until ultimately being absorbed into the UFC 
at the end of 2010. The featherweight and bantamweight divisions were complete-
ly new additions to the UFC, while the WEC lightweight division merged into the 
UFC’s lightweight division, where two former WEC fighters have since held the 
UFC lightweight title.
Data
The dataset for the present study encompasses Zuffa-owned and operated pro-
motions with known cage sizes and octagonal shapes from May 4, 2001—when 
the Unified Rules of MMA were first used in the UFC—through December 31, 
2016. Cage sizes varied over time during the sample period, but cage shape and 
the rules set did not. The number and distribution of bouts by cage size and weight 
class are presented in Table 1.
Women did not compete at all in the WEC, and they comprise the newest di-
visions in the UFC. In total, women’s bouts made up just 3.5% of the data and were 
excluded from the analysis. By the end of 2017, the UFC had three women’s divi-
sions with regularly occurring bouts (strawweight, flyweight, and bantamweight) 
and launched and was attempting to fill out a fourth with quality fighters (feather-
weight). Exploring potential similarities and differences between male and female 
fighters is an area of possible future research as the number of documented female 
bout observations grows. Overall, 18.2% of documented men’s bouts were con-
tested in the smaller 25’ cage.
FightMetric LLC
Cage size and fighter performance statistics were obtained from FightMetric, 
the official statistics provider of the UFC. For each round, FightMetric tracks more 
than 100 performance statistics covering striking, knockdowns, takedowns, grap-
pling, submissions, and time spent in different positions (at distance, in the clinch, 
on the ground, with control, being controlled, etc.). The statistics are documented 
















Heavyweight 324 29 353
Light Heavyweight 357 55 412
Middleweight 494 102 596
Welterweight 668 134 802
Lightweight 692 171 863
Featherweight 288 104 392
Bantamweight 238 105 343
Flyweight 121 7 128
Women's Bantamweight 73 3 76
Women's Straweight 53 11 64
Men's Total 3,182 707 3,889
(82%) (18%) (100%)




and verified using multiple angles of the bout video and slowed down to frame-by-
frame speeds if needed (Genauer, 2013).
FightMetric classifies strikes as either jabs or power strikes. They use vari-
ous cues such as whether it is a kick or a punch, how it is thrown, and the effect 
on the opponent to make their classification. Any strike that is not classified as a 
power strike is classified as a jab. Since MMA promoters sell fight entertainment 
to consumers, this paper examines three types of striking measures they likely 
value most: Total strikes, power strikes, and knockdowns. Total strikes is simply 
the total number of strikes landed (jabs plus power strikes). Power strikes landed 
is examined separately to focus on the strikes more likely to create fight-ending 
damage. The final striking measure, knockdowns (when a strike directly leads 
to the opponent falling to the ground), is perhaps the most exciting element of 
standup fighting. FightMetric records knockdowns that happen at distance as well 
as those that occur in the clinch.
MMA fighters can also damage their opponents and attempt to win bouts 
through grappling and submission attempts. FightMetric classifies submission 
attempts as chokes or joint locks. Chokes attempt to cut off blood flow to the brain 
or disrupt an opponent’s air supply. The most commonly attempted chokes are 
Table 1
Number of Bouts by Weight Class and Cage Size
















Heavyweight 324 29 353
Light Heavyweight 357 55 412
Middleweight 494 102 596
Welterweight 668 134 802
Lightweight 692 171 863
Featherweight 288 104 392
Bantamweight 238 105 343
Flyweight 121 7 128
Women's Bantamweight 73 3 76
Women's Straweight 53 11 64
Men's Total 3,182 707 3,889
(82%) (18%) (100%)
Women's Total 126 14 140
(90%) (10%) (100%)
Note: For all Zuffa-owned UFC and WEC bouts from May 4, 2001 
through December 31, 2016.
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guillotines and rear naked chokes. Well-executed joint locks result in fight-ending 
dislocations, bone breaks, or excruciating pain until an opponent physically or 
verbally “taps out” to signal the referee to stop the fight. The most commonly 
attempted locks are armbars and shoulder locks such as kimuras and americanas. 
Submission attempts mostly occur on the ground, however, guillotine chokes occur 
with some regularity when a standing fighter attempts a takedown and exposes his 
neck near the opponent’s ribcage. Table 2 contains complete descriptions of the 
variables employed in the present study.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for performance outcomes (dependent variables) and 
bout characteristics (independent variables) are presented in Table 3. The dataset 
contains 3,889 men’s bouts resulting in 7,778 fighter-bout observations. While the 
majority of FightMetric’s dataset is complete, the occasional lack of availability of 
fighter age, height, reach, stance, fight time, and betting odds information resulted 
in some missing observations.
Bout characteristics include a fighter’s age, height, reach, and experience, as 
well as their standard normalization (SN) win probability of Sauer (2005) and 
indicators for whether the fighter is a southpaw versus an orthodox opponent, 
whether this is the fighter’s first elite-level MMA bout, whether the bout is five 
rounds (instead of the usual three), and whether it is a title fight. When regression 
analyses are performed, AGE, HEIGHT, REACH, LEFTVSRIGHT, EXPER, and 
1STFIGHT are the difference in values between the fighter in question and the 
opponent.
Possibly the most important performance measure from an MMA promoter’s 
perspective is finishing the fight (KO/TKO or submission), as evidenced by the 
UFC’s fight night bonuses and the in-cage factors that help determine what UFC 
management believes to result in the “best” fight. In this spirit, Figure 1 presents 
a summary of finish rates for large and small cage sizes across the eight men’s 
weight classes in the final dataset. While purely descriptive, it provides elementary 
support for the notion that smaller cages sizes may play a role in nudging fighters 
towards more finishes and fewer decisions.
Within the sample, per Table 3, fighters in the 25’ cage tend to be younger, 
smaller, and less experienced than those in the 30’ cage. The simple mean shows 
a higher rate of finishes in the 25’ cage, yet the negative slopes in Figure 1 sug-
gest that smaller fighters tend to be less likely to finish their fights. All of which 
reinforces the importance of controlling for these potentially confounding factors 
when examining the impact of cage size on performance measures.
Gift
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Note: For all Zuffa-owned UFC and WEC men’s bouts from May 4, 2001 through December 31, 
2016. Bout-level observations for each fighter. STRIKERATE, PSTRIKERATE, CLINCHCPCT, 
GROUNDCPCT, CHOKERATE, and LOCKRATE means are weighted by total time. 






Variable Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
Dependent
FINISH .30 .46 1,414 .27 .44 6,364 .03 .021
UPSET .31 .46 1,310 .32 .47 6,200 -.01 .500
TIME 9.14 6.02 1,376 10.32 6.04 6,364 -1.18 .000
STRIKES 42.61 37.44 1,414 49.50 41.46 6,364 -6.89 .000
PSTRIKES 17.73 15.73 1,414 22.45 19.17 6,364 -4.72 .000
STRIKERATE 23.21 13.38 1,376 23.99 13.88 6,364 -.78 .072
PSTRIKERATE 9.65 7.03 1,376 10.88 7.73 6,364 -1.23 .000
DISTKDRATE .22 .94 1,376 .18 .82 6,364 .04 .031
CLINCHKDRATE .12 1.52 1,288 .10 1.65 6,014 .02 .539
CLINCHCPCT 6.27 8.79 1,376 6.31 9.03 6,364 -.04 .902
GROUNDCPCT 19.84 23.04 1,376 16.71 20.71 6,364 3.13 .000
CHOKERATE .24 .56 1,376 .15 .39 6,364 .09 .000
LOCKRATE .11 .35 1,376 .07 .31 6,364 .04 .000
Independent
SMALLCAGE 1.00 .00 1,414 .00 .00 6,364 1.00 .000
AGE 28.23 3.71 1,401 29.77 4.05 6,319 -1.54 .000
HEIGHT 69.97 3.03 1,413 70.88 3.16 6,361 -.91 .000
REACH 71.53 3.60 1,135 72.86 3.68 5,656 -1.33 .000
LEFTVSRIGHT .13 .33 1,344 .16 .37 6,140 -.03 .001
EXPER 3.84 3.47 1,414 6.45 5.35 6,364 -2.61 .000
1STFIGHT .29 .45 1,414 .14 .35 6,364 .15 .000
SNPROB 50.00 18.76 1,310 50.00 18.94 6,200 .00 1.000
5ROUNDS .07 .26 1,414 .09 .28 6,364 -.02 .071












This study uses observational data from the non-experimental laboratories 
of high-level MMA events. Fighters at the UFC level, and formerly the WEC, are 
among the best in the world, if not the best. They are typically experienced, well-
rounded in a variety of martial arts, and well-conditioned with a sufficient fight 
camp in preparation to challenge their opponent. The model employed to explain 





where fbwt denotes fighter f in bout b in weight class w in time period t. lt and 
gw  are fixed effects for 16 time periods from 2001-2016 and eight weight classes, 
respectively. SMALLCAGE is an indicator equal to one if bout b is fought in the 25’ 
Octagon. The parameter of interest is b1, the marginal effect of cage size.
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Figure 1. Finish Rates by Weight Class and Cage Size
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likely to finish their fights. All of which reinforces the importance of controlling for these 
potentially confounding factors when examining the impact of cage size on productivity 
measures. 
4. Model 
 This study uses observational data from the non-experimental laboratories of high-level 
MMA events. Fighters at the UFC level, and formerly the WEC, are among the best in the world, 
if not the best. They are typically experienc d, well-rounded in a variety of martial arts, and 
well-conditioned with a sufficient fight camp in preparation to challenge their opponent. The 
model e ploy d to explain their productivity outcomes (Y) is: 
(1) fbwtfbwtbwtwtfbwt HEIGHTAGESMALLCAGEY ×+×+×+++= 3210 bbbglb  
 fbwtfbwtfbwt EXPERTLEFTVSRIGHREACH ×+×+×+ 654 bbb  
 bwtfbwtfbwt ROUNDSSNPROBSTFIGHT 51 987 ×+×+×+ bbb  
 fbwtbwtTITLE eb +×+ 10  
where fbwt denotes fighter f in bout b in weight class w in time period t. tl  and wg  are fixed 
effects for 16 time periods from 2001-2016 and eight weight classes, respectively. SMALLCAGE 
is an indicator equal to one if bout b is fought in the 25’ Octagon. The parameter of interest is 
1b , the marginal effect of cage size. 
 Equation 1 is estimated using logit regressions for binary productivity outcomes, 
Heckman regressions for zero-inflated continuous productivity outcomes, and OLS regressions 
for all other continuous productivity outcomes. Standard errors are cluster-corrected at the event 
level as some productivity error terms are correlated across fighter-bout observations with 
certainty while others have a likely non-zero correlation. For example, if one fighter’s FINISH 
Note: For all Zuffa-owned UFC and WEC men’s bouts from May 4, 2001 through 
December 31, 2016. HW is heavy e g t (206-265 lbs.), LHW is light heavyweight 
(186-205 lbs.), MW is middleweight (171-185 lbs), WW is welterweight (156-170 
lbs.), LW is lightweight (146-155 lbs.), FTW is featherweight (136-145 lbs.), BW is 
bantamweight (126-135 lbs.), and FLW is flyweight (116-125 lbs.).
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Equation 1 is estimated using logit regressions for binary performance out-
comes, Heckman regressions for zero-inflated continuous performance outcomes, 
and OLS regressions for all other continuous performance  outcomes. Standard 
errors are cluster-corrected at the event level as some productivity error terms 
are correlated across fighter-bout observations with certainty while others have a 
likely non-zero correlation. For example, if one fighter’s FINISH indicator is “1,” 
the opponent’s will be “0,” leading to a negative correlation of error terms within 
bouts. Likewise, there is a positive correlation between the percentage of time a 
fighter and opponent each have clinch control, implying a likely positive correla-
tion of error terms within bouts when CLINCHCPCT is examined.
Empirical Results
Table 4 presents results for four different regression specifications on the per-
formance outcome likely of the most interest to an MMA promoter—finishing the 
fight by KO/TKO or submission. The first specification controls for bout charac-
teristics only, the second and third specifications add either year or weight class 
fixed effects, and the final specification controls for the full panel of bout charac-
teristics and fixed effects.
In all specifications, increased age over the opponent is strongly associated 
with a lower probability of winning with a finish while more reach, higher SN 
probability, and being a southpaw versus an orthodox opponent are all strongly as-
sociated with higher finishing probabilities. If a bout is scheduled for five rounds, 
the fighters could fight for up to 25 minutes instead of 15. Finishes are more likely 
with longer fights, but when those longer fights have the best-of-the-best squaring 
off against each other for a championship belt, the marginal effect is fewer finishes.
For the parameter of interest, the four specifications reveal the importance of 
controlling for weight class fixed effects. Utilizing the full set of controls, Specifica-
tion 4 suggests that a five-foot reduction in cage size generates a 2.7% increase in 
probability of each fighter winning by finish—as opposed to decision—significant 
at the 5% level. A typical UFC event card presently averages 11.8 bouts, or 23.6 
fighter-bouts. Thus, findings suggest that a 25’ cage, relative to its 30’ counter-
part, would lead to one additional KO/TKO or submission finish, which otherwise 
would have ended in a decision, roughly every one-and-a-half events (1-in-1.57). 
The UFC has recently averaged 475 bouts per year, 25.7 more of which would be 
expected to have a finish rather than go to the judges with a 25’ cage instead of 30’.
Table 5 presents regression results for the SMALLCAGE variable of interest 
for all performance outcomes using the full set of controls from Specification 4. 
Regressions for KDRATE, DISTKDRATE, CHOKERATE, and LOCKRATE were 
estimated with a Heckman model since they contain a large number of zeros (due 
to less frequent occurrences) and such “non-response outcomes” were likely gen-
erated from a time frame that was “too short” as described in Humphreys (2013, 
p. 11).
Results in Table 5 provide evidence that use of the smaller 25’ cage leads to 
1:08 shorter average fight times, a higher proportion of fight time with one fighter 
Gift
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controlling the other in the clinch, higher rates of knockdowns, and higher rates 
of choke attempts, all while overall strikes landed and power strikes landed decline 
but their rates per five minutes remain statistically unchanged. While the multiple 
comparisons problem could potentially be a concern from examination of signifi-
cance across multiple analyses, 8-of-13 estimates in this case are significant at the 
5% level or better and the fight story they support is a sensible one.
Relative to the 30’ cage, the evidence indicates that a smaller 25’ cage leads 
to more finishes and shorter fight times. The decrease in fight time appears to be 
due to two effects: (a) more finishes and therefore fewer decisions and (b) finished 
fights appear to end faster than they otherwise would have. Since fight time is 
shorter, there are declines in overall strikes landed and power strikes landed in 
total, but the rate at which fighters landed overall strikes and power strikes is sta-
tistically unaffected. The increase in finishes appears to come from two sources: 
(a) increased distance knockdown rates and (b) higher rates of choke attempts.
Figure 2 is a visual representation of the two cage sizes observed during the 
sample period. In the first image, Fighter A and Fighter B are standing at dis-
tance with Fighter A having taken the center of the cage—a common occurrence. 
Fighter B has 360 degrees of possible movement—forwards, backwards, sideways, 









Note: Estimates are from logit regressions of FINISH on the independent variables listed. The 
parameter of interest is that of SMALLCAGE. Standard errors are cluster-corrected at the event 




Independent Variables Beta S.E. Beta S.E. Beta S.E. Beta S.E.
SMALLCAGE .114 .071 .042 .074 .181 .072 .148 .074
AGE -.034 .008 -.034 .008 -.034 .008 -.035 .008
HEIGHT -.019 .019 -.019 .019 -.021 .019 -.021 .019
REACH .043 .014 .044 .014 .043 .014 .043 .014
LEFTVSRIGHT .161 .059 .160 .059 .165 .060 .164 .060
EXPER .003 .007 .003 .007 .004 .007 .004 .007
1STFIGHT .151 .105 .157 .104 .152 .105 .155 .105
SNPROB .026 .002 .027 .002 .027 .002 .027 .002
5ROUNDS .565 .101 .611 .103 .444 .102 .455 .104
TITLE -.335 .135 -.445 .137 -.243 .135 -.297 .139
CONSTANT -1.169 .029 -1.756 1.108 -.728 .062 -1.310 1.031
Year Fixed Effects















































ffect of Cage Size on Finishing a Fight
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or angling in or out. In the second image, Fighter B has been pushed towards the 
fence and the more rapid decline in defensive maneuverability in a 25’ cage envi-
ronment could explain the increase in distance knockdown rates observed in the 
data.
Discussion
Cage size in MMA is not simply an operational issue. The present study 
provides evidence that it is a marketing issue as well. With athletic commission 
regulation of the sport of MMA, cage size remains an area where promoters 
maintain discretion over a bout parameter that can influence fighter performance 
and consumer engagement (i.e., that can help MMA promoters “make you not 
take your wife out on Saturday night, not go to a movie, or whatever else you 
might want to do on Saturday night” per UFC President Dana White [Le et al. v. 









Note: Each row is a separate regression of the dependent variable on the full set of covariates and 
fixed effects from Table 4. Results shown are marginal effects for the SMALLCAGE covariate 
of interest. Logit regressions are used for binary dependent variables, Heckman regressions for 
zero-inflated continuous dependent variables, and OLS regressions for all other continuous 
dependent variables. STRIKERATE, PSTRIKERATE, CLINCHCPCT, GROUNDCPCT, 
CHOKERATE, and LOCKRATE regressions are weighted by total time. KDRATE and 
DISTKDRATE regressions are weighted by standing time and distance time, respectively. 
Standard errors are cluster-corrected at the event level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 
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Figure 2. Visual Representation of Octagon Size
Zuffa, LLC, 2018, p. 162]). Findings of the present study are mixed regarding fighter 
performance factors that can influence the entertainment value of a fight.
Smaller cages tend to generate more fight finishes, something UFC management 
attempts to incentivize with KOTN and SOTN bonuses, and an important factor 
in FOTN consideration. They also lead to more knockdowns and choke attempts, 
all while leaving overall strike and power strike rates unchanged. This suggests that 
MMA promotions looking to competitively position themselves as having a higher 
rate of finishes should consider employing a smaller cage.
A tradeoff is that the smaller cage also leads to an increased percentage of 
fight time with clinch control, a position that referees will break with insufficient 
action and UFC management appears to penalize for FOTN consideration. In 
fact, the increased proportion of clinch control results in total clinch time along 
the cage remaining unchanged. The 1:08 reduction in overall fight time appears 
to come entirely from the distance and ground positions, with the majority from 
distance. Thus, while smaller cages tend to generate more exciting outcomes 
such as finishes, knockdowns, and submission attempts, they can also lead to less 
desirable positioning as a higher proportion of fights take place along the cage. 
Profit-maximizing MMA promoters would need to weigh such downside risk 
when making strategic cage-size decisions.
MMA promoters compete not only with other MMA organizations, but with a 
variety of other entertainment options available to potential customers. Enhancing 
the drama and excitement of one’s fights could help improve a promoter’s customer 
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acquisition and retention, but they are not the only relevant factors. Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that some fighters “despise” the 25’ cage, believing it restricts their 
movement (Doyle, 2017). In the competition to acquire and maintain fighter labor 
services, fighter satisfaction with the in-cage environment may also be an impor-
tant consideration. Additionally, a smaller cage may allow for incremental revenue 
generation from an extra row of seats on the venue floor, another factor excluded 
from the present study.
A potential caveat to this study is the possibility of equilibrium training ad-
justments coaches and fighters might make should the UFC ever adopt a marked 
change to its cage sizing decisions. It appears the UFC did not “proactively” in-
form fighters of cage sizes for upcoming fights for at least the large majority of the 
sample period of the present study (Fowlkes, 2014). Advance confirmation or a 
substantial and credible increase in the percentage of events with smaller cage sizes 
could potentially allow coaches and fighters to better prepare for the constraints on 
movement posed by a more limited striking space and the increased likelihood that 
grappling exchanges will take place closer to the fence.
Conclusion
Cage size matters in MMA. It can affect fighter mobility in a manner that ulti-
mately influences key aspects of fighter performance. Thus, cage size can influence 
consumer perceptions of an MMA promotion’s product quality, and possibly the 
satisfaction of its labor providers.
After controlling for bout characteristics as well as time and weight class fixed 
effects, results suggest that, relative to a 30’ cage, a smaller 25’ cage would lead to 
one additional fight finish every 1.57 events, or 25.7 additional finishes over recent 
UFC years. Fight times would decline an average of 1:08, from 10:43 to 9:35, with 
no apparent reduction in the rate at which fighters land overall strikes and power 
strikes. The increase in finishes appears to come from the effect a smaller cage has 
on the rate of distance knockdowns and choke attempts. A potential drawback is 
evidence suggesting an increase in the percentage of fight time taking place in the 
clinch along the cage increases.
MMA is regulated unarmed combat, yet it is also the professional occupation 
of the men and women who choose to test their martial arts skills inside a locked 
cage. This study provides evidence of a statistically significant and likely economi-
cally significant role of the size of that cage in the MMA industry.
References
Andrew, D., Kim, S., O’Neal, N., Greenwell, T., & James, J. (2009). The relation-
ship between spectator motivations and media and merchandise consumption 
at a professional Mixed Martial Arts event. Sport Marketing Quarterly, 18(4), 
199–209.
Association of Boxing Commissions and Combative Sports. (2009). Discussion 




Bieler, D. (2016). New York becomes final state to legalize MMA events. Washing-
tonpost.com. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-
lead/wp/2016/03/22/new-york-becomes-final-state-to-legalize-mma-events
Doyle, D. (2017). Joe Silva responds to Matt Mitrione’s claim that Silva lied about 
Roy Nelson fight. MMAfighting.com. Retrieved from https://www.mmafight-
ing.com/2017/11/27/16706620/joe-silva-responds-to-matt-mitriones-claim-
that-silva-lied-about-roy-nelson-fight
Fowlkes, B. (2014). When it comes to the UFC’s Octagon, for fighters, size matters. 
Mmajunkie.com. Retrieved from https://mmajunkie.com/2014/09/when-it-
comes-to-the-ufcs-octagon-for-fighters-size-matters
Genauer, R. (2013). Personal interview.
Gift, P. (2014). BE Analytics: The recipe for winning UFC Fight of the Night 
bonuses. Bloodyelbow.com. Retrieved from https://www.bloodyelbow.
com/2014/3/5/5465146/mma-ufc-win-fight-of-the-night-bonus-award
Gift, P. (2018a). Performance evaluation and favoritism: Evidence from mixed mar-
tial arts. Journal of Sports Economics. 19(8), 1147–1173.
Gift, P. (2018b). Moving the needle in MMA: On the marginal revenue product of 
UFC fighters. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Humphreys, B. (2013). Dealing with zeros in economic data. Working paper. Re-
trieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/35c3/8229c8f7393acffc93b4a83
120661df1f02c.pdf
Le et al. v. Zuffa, LLC. (2018). 2:15-cv-01045-RFB-PAL. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to 
Zuffa’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 596, Exhibit 31 (D. Nev. Sep-
tember 21, 2018)
Reams, L., & Shapiro, S. (2017). Who’s the main attraction? Star power as a deter-
minant of Ultimate Fighting Championship pay-per-view demand. European 
Sport Management Quarterly, 17(2), 132–151.
Sauer, R. D. (2005). The state of research on markets for sports betting and sug-
gested future directions. Journal of Economics and Finance, 29, 416–426.
Seungmo, K., Greenwell, T., Andrew, D., Lee, J., & Mahony, D. (2008). An analysis 
of spectator motives in an individual combat sport: A study of mixed martial 
arts fans. Sport Marketing Quarterly, 17(2), 109–119.
Tainsky, S., Salaga, S., & Santos, C. (2012). Estimating attendance for the Ultimate 
Fighting Championship: A demand theory approach. International Journal of 
Sport Management and Marketing, 11, 206–224.
Tainsky, S., Salaga, S., & Santos, C. (2013). Determinants of pay-per-view broadcast 
viewership in sports: The case of the Ultimate Fighting Championship. Journal 
of Sport Management, 27, 43–58.
Ultimate Fighting Championship. (2017a). The UFC. Ufc.com. Retrieved from 
http://www.ufc.com/discover/ufc
Ultimate Fighting Championship. (2017b). UFC Statement on Fight Night Bonus-
es. Ufc.com. Retrieved from http://www.ufc.com/news/UFC-Statement-on-
Fight-Night-Bonuses
26
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce. (2017). Back-
ground memo. Energycommerce.house.gov. Retrieved from http://docs.house.
gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20171109/106604/HHRG-115-IF17-20171109-SD003.
pdf
Watanabe, N. (2012). Demand for pay-per-view consumption of Ultimate Fighting 
Championship events. International Journal of Sport Management and Market-
ing, 11, 225–238.
Watanabe, N. (2015). Sources of direct demand: An examination of demand for 
the Ultimate Fighting Championship. International Journal of Sport Finance, 
10, 26–41.
